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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 We consider for the first time whether retail sales taxes 
are “excise” taxes or “trust fund” taxes under the Bankruptcy 
Code.  The distinction is significant because trust fund taxes 
are never dischargeable in bankruptcy.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 
507(a)(8)(C), (E), 523(a)(1)(A). 
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I 
 Appellant Michael Calabrese operated “Don’s What a 
Bagel, Inc.,” which filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code.  As proprietor of a restaurant, 
Calabrese was required by New Jersey law to collect sales tax 
from his customers.  N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 54:32B-3(c)(1), 
54:32B-12(a), 54:32B-14(a).  After failing to confirm a 
reorganization plan, the bankruptcy was converted to Chapter 
7.  Calabrese also filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 
13. 
 The State of New Jersey Department of Taxation (New 
Jersey) filed several secured proofs of claim in Calabrese’s 
individual bankruptcy.  Calabrese moved to have the claims 
reclassified as unsecured, and the Bankruptcy Court granted 
his motion.  New Jersey thereafter filed amended proofs of 
claim alleging that Calabrese owes $63,437.19 in taxes 
collected while operating his business from 2003 to 2009.1
II 
  
Calabrese moved to expunge the claims, and after briefing 
and a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court held the taxes at issue 
are trust fund taxes under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(C) rather 
than excise taxes under § 507(a)(8)(E).  Calabrese appealed 
that decision to the District Court, which affirmed. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the bankruptcy 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and to hear the appeal under 28 
                                                 
1 Of this amount, $56,679.78 is subject to a 
dischargeability determination in this appeal. 
 4 
 
U.S.C. § 158(a), and the Bankruptcy Court adjudicated the 
underlying proceedings under a referral order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 157.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
158(d) and 1291. 
 This appeal presents a question of law, which we 
review de novo.  In re Marcal Paper Mills, Inc., 650 F.3d 
311, 314 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Schlumberger Res. Mgmt. 
Servs., Inc. v. CellNet Data Sys., Inc., 327 F.3d 242, 244 (3d 
Cir. 2003)). 
III 
 We must decide whether the sales taxes held by 
Calabrese are “trust fund” or “excise” taxes under 11 U.S.C. § 
507(a)(8).  Excise taxes receive priority, and are non-
dischargeable, if they are less than three years old, as 
measured from the date of the bankruptcy petition.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(E) (priority); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) 
(“A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor 
from any debt . . . for a tax or a customs duty . . . of the kind 
and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(3) or 507(a)(8) 
of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or 
allowed . . . .”).  Trust fund taxes are always prioritized and 
are never dischargeable irrespective of the age of the debt.  
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8)(C), 523(a)(1)(A). 
 Three of our sister courts of appeals have considered 
the question presented here.  In each case, the court 
determined that the statutory text of § 507(a)(8) does not 
resolve the dispute.  See Shank v. Wash. State Dep’t of 
Revenue, Excise Tax Div. (In re Shank), 792 F.2d 829, 832 
(9th Cir. 1986); DeChiaro v. N.Y. State Tax Comm’n, 760 
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F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1985); Rosenow v. State of Ill., Dep’t 
of Revenue (In re Rosenow), 715 F.2d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 
1983).  Proceeding to analyze the legislative history, all three 
concluded that a sales tax paid by a third party is a trust fund 
tax within the meaning of subsection (C), and not an excise 
tax under subsection (E).  These decisions are discussed in 
greater detail below. 
 We begin with the text of the statute.  The Bankruptcy 
Code provides in pertinent part: 
The following expenses and claims have 
priority in the following order: 
. . . . 
 
(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of 
governmental units, only to the extent 
that such claims are for— 
. . .  
 
(C) a tax required to be collected 
or withheld and for which the 
debtor is liable in whatever 
capacity;  
. . .  
 
(E) an excise tax on—  
 
(i) a transaction occurring 
before the date of the filing 
of the petition for which a 
return, if required, is last 
due, under applicable law 
or under any extension, 
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after three years before the 
date of the filing of the 
petition; or  
 
(ii) if a return is not 
required, a transaction 
occurring during the three 
years immediately 
preceding the date of the 
filing of the petition . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 507(a). 
 If Congress has conveyed its intent through the use of 
unambiguous statutory language, we go no further than the 
text of the statute to discern its meaning.  In re Phila. 
Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Ambiguity is evaluated after “read[ing] the statute in its 
ordinary and natural sense.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We read the statutory language in context but resort 
to legislative history and inquire into the purpose behind the 
statute only if the textual approach yields no solution to the 
interpretive problem.  Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1011–12 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
 Read in its proper context, § 507(a)(8) is susceptible to 
two applications to a sales tax owed by a third party and held 
by a debtor.  Although neither subsection (C) nor subsection 
(E) is unclear, both may be read to apply to this kind of tax.  
Under New Jersey law, the tax is “required to be collected or 
withheld” and Calabrese “is liable [for the tax] in whatever 
capacity.”  The tax at issue is also an “excise tax,” which is 
“[a] tax imposed on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods,” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 646 (9th ed. 2009), or even more 
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broadly, “[a]ny toll or tax,” Excise Definition, Oxford English 
Dictionary, http://www.oed.com (last visited July 3, 2012).  
In short, subsection (a)(8) is ambiguous because it contains 
two clear but contradictory instructions.  Consequently, we 
agree with the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits that extra-textual analysis is required to 
adjudicate this dispute.2
IV 
 
A 
 Congress enacted the first version of what is now § 
507(a)(8) as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.  At the time, the list of 
unsecured governmental claims entitled to priority that is now 
found in subsection (8) was located in subsection (6).  That 
subsection was the topic of debate.  The House bill, H.R. 
8200, proposed a subsection (C) covering “taxes required to 
be withheld from wages, salaries, commissions, dividends, 
interest, or other payments that were paid by the debtor,” 
                                                 
2 Calabrese argues that the Supreme Court’s 
precedents require us to resolve any statutory ambiguity in 
favor of the “equal distribution objective underlying the 
Bankruptcy Code.”  Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich 
Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 667 (2006).  But the ambiguity 
here—unlike the one at issue in Howard Delivery—concerns 
not whether a priority covers a certain type of claim.  Instead, 
the claim at issue here fits within two priorities, and our task 
is to discern which of the two Congress intended bankruptcy 
courts to use.  Therefore, we do not believe the Supreme 
Court’s rule of “tightly constru[ing]” priorities assists us here, 
id., for either priority could be narrowly or broadly construed. 
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which would be dischargeable after two years, along with a 
subsection (E) allowing for the discharge of excise taxes after 
one year.  H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. §§ 507(6), 523(a)(1)(A) (1st 
Sess. 1977); see H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963.  In contrast, the Senate version, S. 
2266, prohibited the discharge of “tax[es] required to be 
collected or withheld” regardless of age, and provided no 
priority for excise taxes.  S. 2266, 95th Cong. §§ 507(a)(6), 
523(a)(1)(A) (2d Sess. 1978); see S. Rep. No. 95-989 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787.   
 In lieu of a formal conference, the two chambers 
informally negotiated an agreement to pass the House bill 
with significant amendments by the Senate.  The Act included 
a version of § 507(a)(6) that represented “a compromise 
between similar provisions contained in H.R. 8200 as passed 
by the House and the Senate amendment.”  124 Cong. Rec. 
32,398 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6451; id. at 
33,997, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6520. 
 In the process, Congress drafted several pieces of 
legislative history that suggest different views on how taxes 
like the one at issue in this appeal should be prioritized.  For 
example, one Report from the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
which accompanied S. 2266, provides: 
 In general, the bill retains two important 
priority rules of present law: first that priority 
and nondischarge are recognized for tax claims, 
for which the tax return was due not more than 
three years before the title 11 petition was filed, 
and for withheld income taxes and the 
employees’ shares of social security taxes (the 
“trust fund” taxes) rceive [sic] priority and are 
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nondischargeable regardless of the due date of 
the return. 
S. Rep. No. 95-989 at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5800.  That same Senate Report later states: 
 Taxes (not covered by the third priority) 
which the debtor was required by law to 
withhold or collect from others and for which 
he is liable in any capacity, regardless of the age 
of the tax claims (§ 507(a)(6)(D)) are included. 
This category covers the so-called “trust fund” 
taxes, that is, income taxes which an employer 
is required to withhold from the pay of his 
employees, the employees’ shares of social 
security and railroad retirement taxes, and also 
Federal unemployment insurance. This category 
also includes excise taxes which a seller of 
goods or services is required to collect from a 
buyer and pay over to a taxing authority. 
Id. at 71 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5857.  The Senate Finance Committee also issued a Report 
that is comparable in substance to the Judiciary Committee’s 
Report.  See S. Rep. No. 95-1106, at 15–16 (1978).  The 
House Report accompanying H.R. 8200 discusses subsection 
(6) briefly, but not in a manner that sheds light on the 
question we address today.  H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 at 357–58, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6313–14. 
 After reconciling the Senate and House versions of the 
bill, the floor managers—Representative Don Edwards and 
Senator Dennis DeConcini—delivered a Joint Statement to 
their respective chambers explaining various provisions of the 
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Act.  See 124 Cong. Rec. 32,392–418, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6436–504 (House floor statement by 
Representative Edwards); id. at 33,992–4,018, reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6505–73 (Senate floor statement by 
Senator DeConcini); see also D Collier on Bankruptcy App. 
Pt. 4(f)(i), at 4-2219 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed.) (explaining that the two chambers agreed on a 
compromise bill and issued a joint explanatory statement, 
whose “effect should be the same” as the product of a 
conference committee).  The Joint Statement includes the 
following passage in the discussion of the subsection under 
review: 
 Fifth.  Taxes which the debtor was 
required by law to withhold or collect from 
others and for which he is liable in any capacity, 
regardless of the age of the tax claims. This 
category covers the so-called “trust fund” taxes, 
that is, income taxes which an employer is 
required to withhold from the pay of his 
employees, and the employees’ share of social 
security taxes. 
. . . . 
 Seventh.  Excise taxes on transactions 
for which a return, if required, is last due, under 
otherwise applicable law or under any extension 
of time to file the return, within 3 years before 
the petition was filed, or thereafter.  If a return 
is not required with regard to a particular excise 
tax, priority is given if the transaction or event 
itself occurred within 3 years before the date on 
which the title 11 petition was filed.  All 
Federal, State or local taxes generally 
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considered or expressly treated as excises are 
covered by this category, including sales taxes, 
estate and gift taxes, gasoline and special fuel 
taxes, and wagering and truck taxes. 
124 Cong. Rec. 32,415–16, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 6497–98 (Edwards); id. at 34,015–16, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6566–67 (DeConcini).  As quoted above, the 
Joint Statement indicates subsection (6) was a compromise 
between the chambers.  Id. at 32,398, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6451 (Edwards); id. at 33,997, reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6520 (DeConcini). 
 The only explicit reference to the treatment of sales 
taxes collected from third parties is found in the passage of 
the Senate Report quoted above, which states that “[t]his 
category also includes excise taxes which a seller of goods or 
services is required to collect from a buyer and pay over to a 
taxing authority.” 
B 
 As we have noted, three other courts of appeals have 
answered the question presented here.  In Rosenow, after 
discussing the statement by Representative Edwards on the 
floor of the House and focusing on the two Reports by the 
Senate Finance and Judiciary Committees, the Seventh 
Circuit distinguished the “two types of sales tax liabilities at 
issue”—those owed by the debtor, and those held by the 
debtor for another—en route to its conclusion that the Illinois 
Use Tax was a trust fund tax.  715 F.2d at 279–80; see Ill. 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Hayslett/Judy Oil, Inc., 426 F.3d 899, 
904–05 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that under Rosenow the 
Illinois Motor Fuel Tax falls under § 507(a)(8)(C)).  After 
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mentioning the legislative history, the Rosenow Court 
“rel[ied] on the plain language of Section C to conclude that 
excise taxes which a retailer has collected from purchasers are 
nondischargeable despite their age.”  715 F.2d at 280.  
Rosenow acknowledged that the debtors’ “strongest 
contention[] [was] that the floor manager of H.R. 8200, which 
ultimately became the new bankruptcy code, referred only to . 
. . traditional ‘trust fund taxes’ when discussing Section C; 
and, when he described the excise taxes covered by Section 
E, he specifically listed sales taxes.”  Id. at 279 (footnote 
omitted).  But the Court dismissed this argument because 
“Representative Edwards did not state that sales taxes or 
excise taxes were intended to be excluded from Section C nor 
did he say that sales taxes collected by a retailer must be 
treated under Section E.”  Id. at 280. 
 The Second Circuit in DeChiaro followed the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Rosenow.  Before doing so, it briefly 
summarized the legislative history, including the history of 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and amendments thereto.  760 
F.2d at 434–35.  The Court found “nothing to indicate that 
Congress intended to change the policy reflected in prior law 
concerning sales taxes collected from others.”  Id. at 435.  
DeChiaro emphasized the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Report and characterized the Joint Statement as “floor 
debate” to justify its result.  Id. at 435–36. 
 In Shank, a divided Ninth Circuit panel found in the 
legislative history “no indication that Congress intended to 
treat retailers differently than employers, who clearly cannot 
discharge their liability for withheld income taxes.”  792 F.2d 
at 832 (citing Rosenow, 715 F.2d at 280).  The Shank Court 
based its decision in part on the legislative history of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.  Id. at 831–32.  The majority 
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bolstered its conclusion with a mention of “public policy 
considerations,” namely its view that “[i]f the obligation to 
the taxing authority can be discharged by a bankruptcy filing 
three years after the transaction giving rise to the tax, such an 
incentive to default will exist.”  Id. at 832. 
 Judge Reinhardt dissented.  Although he “agree[d] 
with the majority that the words of section 507(a)(6) are 
unclear,” id. at 833, the legislative history led him to the 
opposite ultimate conclusion.  Focusing on the contrast 
between the Senate Reports and the Joint Statement of the 
floor managers following the compromise, Judge Reinhardt 
noted three aspects of that statement: first, it describes “excise 
taxes” as encompassing “sales taxes”; second, the definition 
of trust fund taxes mentions only income and social security 
withholdings; and third, the Senate Report’s explicit 
treatment of the third-party sales tax as a trust fund tax does 
not appear in the final Joint Statement.  For these reasons, he 
inferred that such a tax should be treated under subsection 
(E).  Id. at 834–35.  He criticized the majority for reaching 
back to the prior Bankruptcy Act, arguing that it would be 
“too great a burden” to require Congress to justify each 
revision to an overhaul of a legislative scheme.  Id. at 835.  
He also noted that the cases interpreting that Act on which the 
majority relied were decided after the implementation of the 
current Bankruptcy Code and therefore Congress did not have 
the benefit of their interpretation in rewriting the statute.  Id. 
at 835–36.  Judge Reinhardt also believed that the Rosenow 
and DeChiaro courts misread the legislative history by 
underestimating the importance of the Joint Statement.  Id. at 
836 (“Rosenow incorrectly believed that the Joint Statement 
reflected the view of the House of Representatives only . . . . 
In DeChiaro, the court also appeared to have misunderstood 
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the nature of the Joint Statement and the compromise it 
represented, referring to it as mere ‘floor debate.’”).  Finally, 
the dissent noted competing policy considerations, observing 
that Congress is vested with the responsibility of weighing 
policy interests.3
C 
  Id. 
 Reluctant as we are to wade into the murky waters of 
legislative history, the ambiguity inherent in the text of the 
statute requires us to do so.  However, we can be reasonably 
confident in looking to the Joint Statement of Representative 
Edwards and Senator DeConcini as a manifestation of the 
legislature’s purpose, because the Supreme Court has “treated 
their floor statements on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
as persuasive evidence of congressional intent.”  Begier v. 
IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 64 n.5 (1990) (citing Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 351 (1985)); 
accord Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 335 n.21.  And 
although the question is close, we believe our three sister 
courts have reached the correct conclusion, even as we do not 
adopt their logic in toto. 
 The legislative history reveals that the two chambers 
had different views on the dischargeability of various tax 
obligations.  The House passed a debtor-friendly bill with a 
                                                 
3 Two bankruptcy court decisions cited by the parties 
reflect Judge Reinhardt’s view that third-party sales taxes are 
dischargeable.  See In re Boyd, 25 B.R. 1003, 1004 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1982) (reasoning that the adoption of subsection 
(E) evidenced congressional intent to treat all excise taxes 
separately); Tapp v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough (In re Tapp), 
16 B.R. 315, 322–23 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981) (same). 
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narrowly defined trust-fund-tax priority and an excise-tax 
priority, and short windows during which such tax claims 
could not be discharged.  No accompanying report discussed 
the third-party sales taxes at issue in this appeal.  But the 
trust-fund-tax priority clearly did not cover the third-party 
sales tax, so the state’s only protection from discharge—if it 
enjoyed any at all—fell under the excise-tax category.  By 
contrast, the Senate bill favored the state (at least with respect 
to this issue), with a broad trust-fund-tax priority and no 
excise-tax categorization.  The Senate Report states 
unambiguously that the third-party sales tax is covered as a 
trust fund tax. 
 Having expressed divergent views, the House and the 
Senate compromised to produce a bill that became law.  The 
House received its excise-tax prioritization, while the Senate 
received a broad trust-fund-tax priority, along with somewhat 
longer non-dischargeability periods.  Looking only to how the 
text of the bills impacted the statute, we cannot determine 
where our third-party tax should fall, because each chamber 
inserted the provision that it had believed at one time would 
cover such a tax.  We also hesitate to base our decision on the 
Senate and House Reports that predated the compromise.  As 
the Joint Statement itself indicates, and as the Supreme Court 
and commentators alike have recognized, the Joint Statement 
is superior to the other evidence of intent that may be found 
in the legislative record.  See Begier, 496 U.S. at 64 n.5; D 
Collier on Bankruptcy App. Pt. 4(f)(i), at 4-2219; Kenneth N. 
Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 
DePaul L. Rev. 941, 957–60 (1979). 
 Similarly, we decline to hearken back to the nineteenth 
century bankruptcy law. The Shank and DeChiaro courts 
opined that § 17(a)(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 
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541, 30 Stat. 544, 550, amended by Pub. L. No. 89-496, § 2, 
80 Stat. 270 (1966), combined with Congress’s near silence in 
the history and text of the 1978 Act, indicated congressional 
intent for trust fund taxes to include third-party sales taxes, 
and for such taxes to be nondischargeable.  See Shank, 792 
F.2d at 831–32; DeChiaro, 760 F.2d at 434–35.  It is 
undoubtedly true that the legislative landscape at the time 
Congress passes a law sometimes provides evidence of its 
intent in taking that action.  For example, “Congress is 
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial 
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation 
when it re-enacts a statute without change.”  Lorillard v. 
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). 
 But where, as here, Congress overhauls an area of 
federal law, we do not think the former legislative scheme is 
necessarily instructive.  See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52–53 (1982) (“In 
1978, after almost 10 years of study and investigation, 
Congress enacted a comprehensive revision of the bankruptcy 
laws.  The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 (Act) made significant 
changes in both the substantive and procedural law of 
bankruptcy.” (footnote omitted)); Shank, 792 F.2d at 835 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting); S. Rep. No. 95-989 at 1, reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5787 (“The purpose of the bill is to 
modernize the bankruptcy law by codifying a new title 11 that 
will embody the substantive law of bankruptcy . . . .”).  
Whether the former legislative scheme is instructive depends 
on the similarity of the text of the new law to that of the old, 
and whether there is any evidence that Congress intended to 
retain a particular feature of the old law. 
 In this case, there is some evidence that the Senate 
sought to retain the old definition and treatment of trust fund 
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taxes, see S. Rep. No. 95-989 at 14, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5800, but the Senate and the House each 
made concessions to obtain a passable bill.  As a result, the 
Senate Report alone is of little use in revealing ultimate 
congressional intent with respect to the enacted law.  As 
Judge Reinhardt noted, the old law “was vastly different in 
both form and substance from” the new one.  Shank, 792 F.2d 
at 835.  Without any further indication that Congress intended 
to leave untouched the old bankruptcy scheme as a baseline 
against which its new law should be judged, and with a fair 
amount of evidence that the 1978 Act constituted a brand new 
framework, the 1898 Act should not factor into our analysis.  
See id. at 836 (“[G]iven the degree of uncertainty that exists, . 
. . section 17(a)(1) can[not] provide much guidance either 
way.”).  We are convinced the Joint Statement of 
Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini remains the 
superior evidence of congressional intent. 
 Unfortunately, even though the Joint Statement is the 
best evidence before us, it does not help to decide the 
question presented.  We agree with Judge Reinhardt that the 
Shank majority and the DeChiaro and Rosenow courts 
overlooked its importance.  See id.  And yet we cannot agree 
with his conclusion that Congress intended third-party sales 
taxes to be treated under subsection (E).  Judge Reinhardt 
suggests three reasons to favor Calabrese’s position.  He 
observes that the words “sales taxes” appear in the Joint 
Statement’s description of “excise taxes.”  Id. at 834.  
Second, the Joint Statement defines trust fund taxes as 
“‘income taxes which an employer is required to withhold 
from the pay of his employees, and the employees’ share of 
social security taxes,’” a definition that omits the type of tax 
at issue here.  Id. (quoting the Joint Statement).  And finally, 
 18 
 
the Joint Statement omits the single sentence from the Senate 
Report that treats third-party sales taxes as trust fund taxes.  
Id. at 835. 
 Considering first the definition of “sales taxes” in the 
Joint Statement, we think this passing mention is of little 
importance because, when used alone, those words typically 
refer to taxes owed by a purchaser to the government, and not 
the third-party variety at issue in this appeal.  The second and 
third rationales offered by Judge Reinhardt are equally shaky, 
as they rely on omissions in legislative materials.  We do not 
believe that legislative history can be treated with the same 
rigorous rules that we routinely apply to questions of statutory 
construction.  We will never know why Congress chose not to 
tell us how to handle third-party sales taxes; it may have been 
part of an intentional omission on the path to compromise, or 
it may have been an oversight.  In any case, we decline to 
base our decision on such omissions. 
V 
 Faced with an ambiguous statute and an indefinite 
legislative history, we turn to public policy.  As noted by 
Judge Reinhardt, these considerations cut both ways.  See id. 
at 836.  On the one hand, two broad purposes of the 
bankruptcy scheme enacted by Congress are to give the 
debtor a new financial start and to keep creditors on an equal 
playing field.4
                                                 
4 These general policies are frequently overridden by 
statute.  See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 
(1991) (“The statutory provisions governing 
nondischargeability reflect a congressional decision to 
exclude from the general policy of discharge certain 
  See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 
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531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[A] maximum and 
equitable distribution for creditors and ensuring a ‘fresh start’ 
for individual debtors[] [are] often said [to be] at the core of 
federal bankruptcy law.”).  On the other hand, the incentives 
for a potential debtor like Calabrese would be quite perverse 
if, when he sees his business take a turn for the worse, he 
knows he might obtain a discharge of his debt if he refuses to 
turn over to the state sales taxes collected from third parties.  
See Shank, 792 F.2d at 832.  On balance, we think the second 
consideration weighs more heavily. 
 We also find significant the fact that third-party sales 
taxes resemble trust fund taxes more than other sales taxes 
even though the source of taxation is a sales transaction.  
After all, such taxes are owed not by the debtor, but are 
merely held by the debtor on behalf of the party that owes the 
tax to be transferred to the taxing authority at a later time.  
Using similar reasoning, the Supreme Court in Begier, 
considering the interactions of various statutes from the 
Bankruptcy and Internal Revenue Codes, concluded that taxes 
required to be withheld by an employer under the Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3102(a), are held in 
trust for the IRS even when those taxes are improperly 
comingled with the employer’s general operating funds.  496 
                                                                                                             
categories of debts—such as child support, alimony, and 
certain unpaid educational loans and taxes, as well as 
liabilities for fraud.”); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 
279–82 (1978) (“[W]hile it is true that a finding of 
nondischargeability prevents a bankrupt from getting an 
entirely ‘fresh start,’ this observation provides little assistance 
in construing a section expressly designed to make some 
debts nondischargeable.”). 
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U.S. at 55–67.  “Because the debtor does not own an 
equitable interest in property he holds in trust for another, that 
interest is not ‘property of the estate[,]’ [n]or is [it] ‘property 
of the debtor’ . . . .”  Id. at 59 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 
547).  The analogy to Begier is not a perfect one, but the 
underlying principle—that the debtor is responsible for 
money in which he never had an equitable interest—is just as 
applicable here. 
 Finally, our decision is consistent with New Jersey’s 
own treatment of its sales tax.  Under New Jersey law, “the 
vendor collects the tax from its customers, and holds it in 
trust until it is reported and turned over to the State.  This is 
not a tax imposed on the vendor but on the vendor’s 
customer, and as such is what is commonly called a ‘trust 
fund’ tax.”  Yilmaz, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 22 N.J. Tax 
204, 231 (2005) (citation omitted) (citing Cooperstein v. State 
of N.J., Div. of Taxation, 13 N.J. Tax 68, 78 n.4 (1993)), 
aff’d, 915 A.2d 1069, 1072 & n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2007); accord N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:32B-12(a) (“The [sales] 
tax shall be paid to the person required to collect it as trustee 
for and on account of the State.”).  That the Tax Court of New 
Jersey has recognized its sales tax is a trust fund tax when 
held by a business owner for the customer validates our 
common-sense construction of § 507(a)(8). 
 In sum, we believe public policy concerns weigh 
against Calabrese, primarily because sales taxes collected by 
a retailer never become the property of the retailer; ab initio, 
it retains those funds in trust for the state.  Accordingly, we 
hold that Calabrese’s sales-tax obligation is subject to 
§ 507(a)(8)(C) and is not dischargeable.  We will affirm the 
order of the District Court. 
